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  Explaining and the determinants of dividend policy is one of the biggest challenges that have 
long been the center of attention of accounting and financial researcher and theoreticians. There 
are many evidences that confirm the effects of dividend and there are a lot of other potential 
factors whose effects on the dividend policy have not been studied yet. In this study, the effects 
of four variables including asymmetric information, growth opportunities, cash holding and 
firm size in payout dividend policy are investigated, simultaneously. The study uses the 
information of 140 companies listed on Tehran Stock Exchange over the period 2005-2010. In 
this study, 4 hypotheses are proposed and investigated. There are positive and significant 
relationships between asymmetric information, growth opportunities, cash holding and 
company size on one side and payout dividend policy on the other side.  
   © 2013 Growing Science Ltd.  All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction 
Explaining and the determinants of dividend policy is one of the biggest challenges that have long 
been the center of attention of accounting and financial researcher and theoreticians (Jensen, 1986; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Jensen et al., 1992; Porta et al., 1999). There are many 
evidences that confirm the effects of dividend and there are a lot of other potential factors whose 
effects on the dividend policy have not been studied yet (Tang & Jang, 2007). Barclay et al. (1995) 
state that finance scholars have engaged in extensive theorizing about factors that might be essential 
in determining a firm's leverage and dividend policies. Al-Malkawi (2007) examined the determinants 
of corporate dividend policy in Jordan. The study used a firm-level panel data set of all publicly 
traded firms on the Amman Stock Exchange over the period 1989-2000. The study developed eight 
research hypotheses, which are implemented to represent the main theories of corporate dividends. 
They also used a general-to-specific modeling technique to choose between the competing   2090
hypotheses. They reported that the proportion of stocks held by insiders and state ownership 
influenced the amount of dividends paid, significantly. Size, age, and profitability of the firm seemed 
to be determinant factors of corporate dividend policy in Jordan. Baker Wurgler (2004) proposed that 
the decision to pay dividends could be driven by prevailing investor demand for dividend payers.  
 
According to Baker and Wurgler (2002), firms are more likely to issue equity when their market 
values are high, compared with book and past market values, and to repurchase equity when their 
market values were low.  Benartzi et al. (1997) explained that many dividend theories indicate that 
changes in dividends have information content about the future earnings of the firm but their 
investigation provided limited support for it. Boulton et al. (2012) examined the effect of tax burden 
on cash distribution based on a sample of Brazilian firms, which were permitted by law to distribute 
cash to shareholders in two forms of dividends and tax-advantaged interest on equity. They reported 
that taxes were a primary determinant of Brazilian firms’ payout policy decisions, as profitability and 
payout ratios were associated with the likelihood that a firm pays interest on equity.  
 
Brav et al. (2005) surved 384 financial executives and conduct in-depth interviews with an additional 
23 to detect the factors that drive dividend and share repurchase decisions. They reported that 
maintaining the dividend level was on par with investment decisions, while repurchases were made 
out of the residual cash flow after investment spending. Brockman and Unlu (2011) investigated the 
agency cost version of the lifecycle theory of dividends by taking advantage of cross-country 
variations in disclosure environments and confirmed that the lifecycle theory of dividends explains 
dividend payout patterns around the world. Cao et al. (2011) investigated disproportional ownership 
structure and pay–performance relationship by looking on some evidence from China's listed firms. 
Chae et al. (2009) tried to find out how corporate governance has affected payout policy under 
agency problems and external financing constraints. Chen and Dhiensiri (2009) tried to find 
determinants of dividend policy by looking into some evidences from New Zealand. Crutchley and 
Hansen (1989) presented a test of the agency theory of managerial ownership, corporate leverage, and 
corporate dividends. Denis and Osobov (2008), Easterbrook (1984) and Grullon and Michaely (2002) 
tried to find out why firms pay dividend.   
 
Guay and Harford (2000) performed an investigation to find out the cash-flow permanence and 
information content of dividend increases versus repurchases. Gul (1999) discussed government share 
ownership, investment opportunity set and corporate policy choices in China. Gul (1999), in other 
investigation, tried to find out more about growth opportunities, capital structure and dividend 
policies in Japan. Hovakimian et al. (2004) tried to find out about the determinants of target capital 
structure by looking into some cases associated with dual debt and equity issues. Jagannathan et al. 
(2000) discussed the financial flexibility and the choice between dividends and stock repurchases. 
Lopez de Silanes et al. (2000) discussed agency problems and dividend policies around the 
world.  Lintner (1956) performed a comprehensive discussion on distribution of incomes of 
corporations among dividends, retained earnings, and taxes. 
 
2. The proposed study 
 
In this study, four effects, namely: asymmetric information, growth opportunities, cash holding and 
companies size in payout dividend policy are investigated, simultaneously. The method of this 
research is categorized in applied sciences and it is based on observations in order to find the 
correlation and description between the parameters. The assumption in this research is to consider 
four mentioned parameters as influential agents on the dividend policy simultaneously and it tests in 
two models including Panel and Pool regression analysis.  
 
In this study, 4 hypotheses are proposed and investigated as follows, 
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1.  There is a meaningful relationship between asymmetry information and dividend policy. 
2.  There is a meaningful relationship between growth opportunities and dividend policy.  
3.  There is a meaningful relationship between cash holding and dividend policy. 
4.  There is a meaningful relationship between firm size and dividend policy.  
 
The proposed study of this paper considers 140 companies listed on Tehran Stock Exchange over the 
period of 2005-2010. Table 1 demonstrates some of basic statistics on the sample data. 
 
Table 1 
The summary of basic statistics  
Variable   No.     Mean   Standard deviation   Variance   Skewnes
s
Kurtosis   Standard deviation  
Skewness   Kurtosis
Paid dividend   840   0.15   0.148   0.022 1.671 3.231 19.806   19.172
Asymmetry  840   0.176   0.114   0.013 1.38 2.986 16.352   17.719
Growth  840   2.105   1.801   3.244 3.185 15.382 37.758   91.274
Holding cash   840   0.062   0.071   0.005 3.125 13.019 37.039   77.247
Firm size   840   5.785   0.623   0.388 0.997 1.099 11.817   6.521
  
The proposed study of this paper considers two independent variables including asymmetry 
information and growth opportunity and there are two control variables of holding cash and firm size. 
In order to test different hypotheses based on the data we first need to make sure the data are 
normally distributed and Table 2 summarizes the necessary tests for this purposes. 
 
Table 2 
The summary of testing normality 
Variables   No.   Kolmogorov-Smirnov   Shapiro-Wilk Jarque- Bera  
Statistics   Sig Statistics Sig Statistics   Sig
Paid dividend   840   0.156   0 0.835 0 748.93   0
Asymmetry   840   0.088   0 0.91 0 572.4336   0
Growth   840   0.16   0 0.718 0 9591.436   0
Firm size   840   0.083   0 0.941 0 179.8605   0
Holding cash   840   0.194   0 0.685 0 7217.297   0
 
Based on the results of Table 2, we can conclude that none of the independent variables is normally 
distributed. The other  
 
Table 3 
The summary of testing fixed or variable effects using Chaw or Husman tests 
Chaw   Husman  
F Statistics   Sig.   Result   Chi-Square   Sig.   Result  
1.220446   0.2975   Equal intercept              
9.935152   0   Slopes are different   39.243901   0   Random effect rejected  
 
Next, we need to make sure that the linear regression can be used between independent variables and 
dependent variable and there is no auto correlation. Table 4 summarizes the results of our survey. 
 
 
Table 4 
The summary of F-value and Durbin-Watson 
Model   Linear relationship   Durbin Watson Residual  
F   Sig.   D.W D.W J-B   Sig
Null   255.3621   0   0.887359 2.3 - 1.7 29.84147 0
Corrected   520.7036   0   2.080574 2.3 - 1.7 10.49817 0.005252  
   2092
The results of Table 4 confirm that we can use linear regression technique and the corrected model 
maintains a good value for Durbin-Watson. In addition, Fig. 1 demonstrates the results of our survey. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. The results of residuals over  the period 2005-2010 (1385-1389 local calendar)  
 
Finally, we present the correlation ratios among independent variables. 
 
Table 5 
The summary of correlation ratios among independent variables 
Variable   Growth opportunity   Firm size Asymmetry  Holding cash  
Growth opportunity   1  0.019 0.38  0.112
Firm size   0.019  1 0.037  0.039
Asymmetry information   0.38  0.037 1 0.224
Holding cash   0.112  0.039 0.224  1
  
The results of Table 5 indicate that there are not strong correlations among independent variables. 
Therefore, we can use all independent variables for the proposed study, simultaneously.  
 
3. The results  
 
Based on applying different tests we are now able to apply linear regression technique and the results 
are summarized in Table 6 as follows, 
 
Table 6 
The results of regression analysis 
Variable  Coefficient Standard  deviation  t-student  Sig. 
Intercept  -0.114109  0.045552  -2.505004  0.0125 
Asymmetry information  0.371206 0.028352  13.09285  0.000 
Growth opportunity  0.003308  0.001684  1.963812  0.05 
Firm size  0.019497 0.007975  2.444808  0.0147 
Holding cash  0.168821  0.030152  5.598984  0.000 
AR(1)  0.708243 0.023483  30.15955  0.000 
R
2=0.8577, AdR
2=0.8560, F=520.70, D.W=2.08, S.E.of regression=0.069373, Sum squared resid=3.3255  
The results of Table 6 clearly state that there are some positive and meaningful relationship between 
independent variables and dependent variables and all t-student values are statistically significance. 
  
4. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have presented an empirical investigation to study the relationship between four 
financial figures including asymmetry information, growth opportunity, firm size and holding cash on 
dividend policy. Using the information of selected firms listed on Tehran Stock Exchange, the study 
has implemented linear regression technique and the results have indicated that there were some 
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positive and meaningful relationship between these four variables and dividend policy. The 
regression technique could describe 86% of the data, which means the model is highly reliable. 
 
References 
 
Al-Malkawi, H. A. N. (2007). Determinants of corporate dividend policy in Jordan: an application of 
the Tobit model. Journal of Economic and Administrative Sciences, 23(2), 44-70. 
Baker, M., & Wurgler, J. (2002). Market timing and capital structure. The Journal of Finance, 57(1), 
1-32. 
Baker, M., & Wurgler, J. (2004). A catering theory of dividends. The Journal of Finance, 59(3), 
1125-1165. 
Barclay, M. J., Smith, C. W., & Watts, R. L. (1995). The determinants of corporate leverage and 
dividend policies. Journal of applied corporate finance, 7(4), 4-19. 
Benartzi, S., Michaely, R., & Thaler, R. (1997). Do changes in dividends signal the future or the 
past?. The Journal of Finance, 52(3), 1007-1034. 
Boulton, T. J., Braga-Alves, M. V., & Shastri, K. (2012). Payout policy in Brazil: Dividends versus 
interest on equity. Journal of Corporate Finance, 18(4), 968-979. 
Brav, A., Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Michaely, R. (2005). Payout policy in the 21st 
century. Journal of Financial Economics, 77(3), 483-527. 
Brockman, P., & Unlu, E. (2011). Earned/contributed capital, dividend policy, and disclosure quality: 
an international study. Journal of Banking & Finance,35(7), 1610-1625. 
Cao, J., Pan, X., & Tian, G. (2011). Disproportional ownership structure and pay–performance 
relationship: evidence from China's listed firms. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(3), 541-554. 
Chae, J., Kim, S., & Lee, E. J. (2009). How corporate governance affects payout policy under agency 
problems and external financing constraints. Journal of Banking & Finance, 33(11), 2093-2101. 
Chen, J., & Dhiensiri, N. (2009). Determinants of dividend policy: the evidence from New 
Zealand. International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, 34, 18-28. 
Crutchley, C. E., & Hansen, R. S. (1989). A test of the agency theory of managerial ownership, 
corporate leverage, and corporate dividends. Financial Management, 36-46. 
Denis, D. J., & Osobov, I. (2008). Why do firms pay dividends? International evidence on the 
determinants of dividend policy. Journal of Financial Economics, 89(1), 62-82. 
Easterbrook, F. H. (1984). Two agency-cost explanations of dividends.  The American Economic 
Review, 74(4), 650-659. 
Grullon, G., & Michaely, R. (2002). Dividends, share repurchases, and the substitution 
hypothesis. The Journal of Finance, 57(4), 1649-1684. 
Guay, W., & Harford, J. (2000). The cash-flow permanence and information content of dividend 
increases versus repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics, 57(3), 385-415. 
Gul, F. A. (1999). Government share ownership, investment opportunity set and corporate policy 
choices in China. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 7(2), 157-172. 
Gul, F. A. (1999). Growth opportunities, capital structure and dividend policies in Japan. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 5(2), 141-168. 
Hovakimian, A., Hovakimian, G., & Tehranian, H. (2004). Determinants of target capital structure: 
The case of dual debt and equity issues. Journal of Financial Economics, 71(3), 517-540. 
Jagannathan, M., Stephens, C. P., & Weisbach, M. S. (2000). Financial flexibility and the choice 
between dividends and stock repurchases. Journal of financial Economics, 57(3), 355-384. 
Jensen, M. (1986). Agency cost of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers.  Corporate 
Finance, and Takeovers. American Economic Review,76(2). 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360. 
Jensen, G. R., Solberg, D. P., & Zorn, T. S. (1992). Simultaneous determination of insider ownership, 
debt, and dividend policies. Journal of financial and Quantitative analysis, 27(02), 247-263.   2094
Lintner, J. (1956). Distribution of incomes of corporations among dividends, retained earnings, and 
taxes. The American Economic Review, 46(2), 97-113. 
Lopez de Silanes, F., Vishny, R., & Shleifer, A. (2000). Agency problems and dividend policies 
around the world. Journal of finance, 60(1), 1-33. 
Myers, S. C. (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of financial economics, 5(2), 147-
175. 
Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. The 
journal of finance, 54(2), 471-517. 
Tang, C. H. H., & Jang, S. S. (2007). Revisit to the determinants of capital structure: a comparison 
between lodging firms and software firms.  International Journal of Hospitality 
Management, 26(1), 175-187. 
 
 